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Abstract 
Using a large panel dataset of Chinese industrial firms, we examine the determinants of 
access to loans from formal financial intermediaries and extension of trade credit. Poorly 
performing SOEs were more likely to redistribute credit to firms with less privileged 
access to loans via trade credit, a pattern consistent with some of the extension of trade 
credit being involuntary. By contrast, profitable private domestic firms were more likely 
to extend trade credit than unprofitable ones. Trade credit likely provided a substitute for 
loans for these private firms’ customers that were shut out of formal credit markets. As 
biases in lending became less severe, the amount of trade credit extended by private firms 
declined.    
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China’s growth remains a puzzle. In an economy heavily influenced by state 
involvement, including the ownership of a substantial share of productive capacity, the 
private sector has achieved explosive growth. However, the institutions typically 
associated with private growth, particularly those associated with law and finance, are not 
well developed by international standards.
1  Indeed, Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005), 
hereafter AQQ, point out that low levels of institutional development in China (broadly 
defined to include courts, property rights and finance) have acted as a brake on growth. 
Thus, the law-institutions-finance view is better able to account for the sluggish 
performance of SOEs and the listed sector than the dynamism of the private sector. 
This is not to argue that the institutions that support growth of the private sector in 
other countries are irrelevant for China, or that they will not be important in the future. 
There is, for example, wide variation across regions in the quality of institutions that 
helps explain similarly wide variation in private economic activity. Using a detailed 
survey of enterprises in 18 cities that span all Chinese regions, Cull and Xu (2005) find 
that enterprise managers' perceptions about the security of property rights, the risk of 
expropriation by government officials, the efficiency and reliability of courts, and access 
to credit all affect profit reinvestment rates, which ultimately support a substantial share 
of firm growth.  
However, the fact remains that for many reasonable cross-country measures of 
institutional development China lags, and yet has a remarkable growth rate fueled by the 
private sector. There must, therefore, be mechanisms by which private firms have been 
able to bypass formal institutions and bring about growth. AQQ (2005) go as far as to 
argue that: “During the early stages of economic growth, alternative institutions and 
mechanisms alone can support the growth of firms and the overall economy, as is the 
                                                 
1  See LaPorta, Lopez-de-Slianes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998, 2000) on the effects of legal origins on 
institutions, which in turn affect economic outcomes. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2003) show that legal origin has implications for the functioning of courts. Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001) and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003a,b) examine how endowments related to 
geography and the disease environment affected institutional development, including legal and financial 
institutions. Engerman and Sokoloff (2000, 2002, 2005)  examine the role of geographic endowments on a 
broader range of institutions, including schooling and the right to vote.  Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff 
(2002) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) examine the role of contracting and property rights institutions 
on financial and economic outcomes. A final strand of literature, including Beck, Levine and Loayza 
(2000a,b), Levine and Zervos (1998), and Rajan and Zingales (1998), establishes a link between financial 
development and growth. In the Beck et al. papers, legal origin is often used as an instrument to 
demonstrate that the finance-growth link is causal.   3
case for China based on our evidence.” (p.82).  Based on their study of European 
transition economies, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) conjecture that formal market-
supporting institutions are needed when competition forces down profit margins and 
when relational contracting gives way to arms-length contracting, often because products 
and transactions have become more complex. Ex ante contracting becomes necessary to 
coordinate buyers and sellers. Such competitive pressures are present and growing in 
China, and thus the gradual transition from informal to formal market-supporting 
institutions is likely to be well under way. Therefore, to ascribe all of China’s remarkable 
growth to informal institutions could be an overstatement.   
In fact, little is known about whether and how these informal arrangements work 
and how much economic activity they support in China. Using an extensive, nationally 
representative database of over 100,000 firms including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
we hope to fill a part of that gap by examining the extension of trade credit, one of the 
informal mechanisms suggested by AQQ (2005) and McMillan and Woodruff (1999) as 
being relevant for countries at China’s level of institutional development.  We test 
whether Chinese firms have used this channel to bypass or substitute for formal 
institutions to bring about growth.  We can identify the firm’s ownership type (state, 
collective, legal-person, private, or foreign), its reliance on external finance, and its 
profitability, which enables us to test how access to formal finance affects the extension 
of trade credit, and how that relationship differs across ownership types.  
The use of trade credit is prevalent also in developed market economies. In fact, it 
is “the single most important source of short-term external finance for firms in the United 
States” (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). The finance literature on trade credit has mostly 
focused on the issue of why trade credit is used in inter-firm transactions when 
specialized financial intermediaries such as banks can provide finance. Most theories 
attribute the use of trade credit to information or other advantages that suppliers have 
over financial institutions in providing credit to their own customers.
2   A number of 
empirical studies (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999) have tried to 
test these theories by assessing the determinants of trade credit.  
More recently, there is a new literature on the role of trade credit as an informal 
financial institution in developing and transitional economies where formal financing 
                                                 
2 See Petersen and Rajan (1997) for a summary of theories of trade credit and a test of these theories. For 
more recent theoretical models, see Biais and Gollier (1997)and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004).    4
channels are underdeveloped. McMillan and Woodruff (1999) study the determinants of 
the prevalent use of trade credit among private firms in Vietnam, finding that trade credit 
is more likely to be extended by a supplier when the duration of the relationship with the 
customer is longer, the customer has fewer alternative sources of supply, or the customer 
is identified through a business network.  Coricelli (1996) argues that private trade credit 
markets played a key role in Poland’s economic transition. In cross country studies, 
Fisman and Love (2003) find that in countries with relatively weak financial institutions, 
firms in industries that rely heavily on trade credit have higher growth rates; and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) find trade credit to be more prevalent in 
countries with poorer legal systems. 
In China, it is not so much the lack of a formal financial system but rather its 
institutional bias in favor of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that could give rise to trade 
credit use among viable firms with restricted or no access to credit from state-owned 
banks. China therefore offers an opportunity to study trade credit in a state-dominated 
banking environment notorious for misallocating credit (Lardy, 1998; Cull and Xu, 
2003).  
Our data only allow us to examine the determinants of the supply of trade credit, 
because they do not have information on recipients of trade credit. Using a small survey 
data set, Ge and Qiu (2005) find that non-state-owned firms receive more trade credit 
than state-owned firms, and are more likely to use that funding for investment than for 
transactional purposes. Thus, the patterns of trade credit extension that we document are 
likely to be supportive of productive activities. Moreover, the least profitable SOEs in our 
sample were most likely to redistribute bank loans via trade credit, which could be 
consistent with improvement in the overall allocation of credit. However, the relatively 
modest amount of total trade credit extended and its decline late in the period indicate 
that this channel cannot explain a large share of the recent growth. Other mechanisms, 
formal and informal, must also be playing a role. 
 
1.  A Simple Model of Trade Credit Extension 
The key relationships in our analysis are between bank loans received, trade credit 
extended, and profitability. We illustrate the trade-offs faced by a firm in deciding to 
extend trade credit using a simple, reduced-form model. A firm receives loans from   5
formal financial intermediaries totaling B which it can allocate to its own investment 
projects or to extending trade credit to its customers. We assume that the average return 
on its own investment projects is declining in the number of projects that it pursues, 
because it pursues its best opportunities first and because it has limited capacity to 
monitor projects. The payoff to those projects is:   
r f(Kf)* Kf 
where Kf is the amount of loans invested in the firm’s own projects and rf(Kf) is the 
average return on those projects, which is declining in Kf . The remainder of the firm’s 
loans is used to extend trade credit to the firm’s customers, who have difficulty in 
accessing formal finance. Under these arrangements, the firm provides goods or services 
to a customer with an agreement to receive payment (typically higher than the price the 
customer would pay if it had not received trade credit) in the future.
3 Here we use a 
reduced-form representation of the benefit of extending trade credit, and denote the 
firm’s payoff to a portfolio of trade credit as follows: 
rs(Ks)* Ks 
where Ks is the amount of formal loans redistributed to customers as trade credit and 
rs(Ks) is the average return on its trade credit portfolio, which, we assume, is declining in 
Ks. This would occur when the firm enters into trade credit arrangements with its most 
creditworthy customers first.  
The firm’s maximization problem is simply: 
Max ∏
f k
 = r f(Kf)* Kf  + rs(Ks)* Ks 
Subject to: Kf + Ks = B 
For the purpose of this model, we assume that rf(Kf) and rs(Ks) are linear: 
rf(Kf) = αf – βf Kf  and rs(Ks) = αs – βsKs   
The first order condition is: 
f K ∂
Π ∂
= αf – 2βf Kf – αs – 2βsKf  + 2Bβs = 0 
Resulting in an equilibrium level for Kf: 
                                                 
3  These are in effect short-term business loans made by suppliers, often to expand their market and 
customer base. Suppliers can also track repayment through repeated interactions, thus resolving 
informational asymmetries about the creditworthiness of their customers that formal financial 
intermediaries can not.   6
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To motivate the empirical tests that follow, we are most interested in how access to loans 
affects 
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As the firm receives more formal loans, it allocates those funds based on the (declining) 
slope of the returns to its own projects versus the slope of the returns associated with 
extending trade credit. If the firm’s network of customers tends not to be creditworthy, βs 
will be large, and those new funds will result in relatively more investment in its own 
projects (i.e., a larger 
*
f K  relative to 
*
s K ). If the firm’s own investment prospects are 
poor, βf  will be large, resulting in relatively more extension of trade credit.  
  As we demonstrate below, unprofitable SOEs in our sample tended to receive 
more loans than others, reflecting the institutional bias of the state-owned banking 
system. In the context of this simple illustration, their low profitability also reflects 
relatively poor investment opportunities, and thus a relatively large βf. Unprofitable SOEs 
thus had both poor investment opportunities and relatively abundant credit from banks or 
other formal financial intermediaries. We would therefore expect them to be more likely 
to extend trade credit to their customers. Provided the returns to extending trade credit 
were not too low, redistribution of formal loans by SOEs to their customers might have 
resulted in a more efficient allocation of credit.  
  Private domestic firms tended to receive fewer formal loans than SOEs and bail-
outs from state banks were less likely. We would therefore expect that the only reason 
that these firms would have an incentive to extend credit is for the reasons typically 
suggested in the literature – to stabilize, improve, and expand their customer base, and to 
redistribute relatively cheap loans (at a profit) based on superior information about their 
customers’ ability to repay. Profitable private firms were likely in a better position to   7
secure loans for these purposes, or their profits themselves could be used to underwrite 
trade credit. Profitability might also have been an indication that they could attract a 
high-quality portfolio of customers. In addition, private firms have stronger incentives to 
monitor the repayment of trade credit and better incentives to screen "good" clients.  For 
all these reasons, we might expect that profitable private firms would have extended more 
trade credit than others.  
 
2.  Data 
Our data are drawn from the annual accounting reports filed by industrial firms 
with the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and thus the firms in the database tend to be 
large and medium-sized. All industrial SOEs are included, along with all other firms with 
more than 5 million Yuan of sales.
4  The data are for 1998 to 2003; for each year after 
1998 the sample contains information from over 100,000 firms (Table 1).
5 These firms 
represent about half of the value added of Chinese industrial firms, and twenty to twenty-
five percent of national GDP.   
We can identify five different types of firm ownership: state, collective, legal 
person, domestic private, and foreign. Collective firms are distinct from state-owned in 
that they are either owned by township-village governments or collectively by the 
employees. Legal-person share is a mixture of ownership by state legal persons and 
private legal persons, and based on our conversation with Chinese accounting experts, 
state legal persons likely account for the majority of legal person-owned firms.
6  We 
classify firms according to their largest ownership type. Therefore, if the state holds forty 
percent of a firm’s shares, while domestic private and foreign interests each hold thirty 
percent, the firm is classified as state-owned.  Table 2 shows that the share of the sample 
comprised by SOEs declined from 33% to 16%, that of collective firms from 29% to 
                                                 
4 However, the threshold of 5 million Yuan is not strictly enforced in the survey so that we do observe 
some firms with smaller figures of sales. 
5 The sample size in 1998 is half that of the later years because we use lagged variables in the regressions.  
Because data were not available for 1996 or 1997, the lagged values for most of the 1998 variables are for 
1995, a year in which data were available for a much smaller number of firms. For variables related to size, 
we assume a smooth growing trend, and use the imputed 1997 value as the lagged value for 1998.  As a 
robustness check we dropped the 1998 data from our analysis and the main results remained intact. Given 
our interest in changes in the relationships between receipt of loans, firm profitability, and the extension of 
trade credit over time, we have opted to keep the 1998 data to estimate our base results. 
6 Legal persons represent a form of corporate ownership. These corporations are legal entities which, while 
being owned collectively by a number of natural persons, exist completely separately from them. Under 
many legal systems, this separation gives the corporation powers that other legal entities lack.   8
13%, that of legal person-owned firms increased from 13% to 21%, that of domestic 
private firms from 13% to 34%, and that of foreign firms from 12% to 16%.  This period 
thus witnessed a significant change in ownership of firms, though in any given year a 
substantial number of firms of each ownership type can be found.  We also control for 
year dummies to capture the case of macro fluctuations in interest rates. 
The breadth of the sample is its key advantage, though that breadth comes at a 
minor cost in terms of the depth of financial information. For example, we have data on 
the amount of accounts receivable but not accounts payable. As noted, however, an 
examination of the credit extended by suppliers of goods and services to their customers 
can shed light on the motivations of the providers, and on how trade credit extension is 
related to access to formal sources of finance. In the Chinese case, the key source of 
external funding is loans from banks or other formal financial intermediaries such as trust 
companies and credit cooperatives. However, the NBS dataset does not provide 
information on the quantity of loans that a firm receives. We therefore follow the 
example of other authors that have used these data such as Cai, Liu, and Xiao (2005), and 
construct a proxy for the use of loans from formal financial intermediaries equal to 
interest payments divided by total sales.  In China, most interest rates are fixed or float 
within a rather narrow band and thus interest payments provide information about the 
stock of pending loans. One might be concerned that the ratio of interest payments to 
assets would be misleadingly low for firms that default. However, credit tends to be 
rolled over and thus defaults are rare. In addition, we include profitability in all of the 
trade credit regressions that follow, which should help control for a firm’s ability to repay 
its loans.  It is also useful to point out that interest payments covers interest expenses, 
processing fees from banks, finance companies (including trust and investment 
companies), and credit cooperatives, most of which are state-owned.  In principle interest 
payments may also include informal debt (such as from underground loan sharks).   
However, such informal loan payments should be very small in our sample, which 
consists of state-owned enterprises that have relatively good access to bank finance, and 
non-state firms that exceed sales of 5 million yuan.  These large non-state firms should 
also have better access to formal finance than small private firms.  For simplicity, we 
shall view interest payments over sales as a proxy for a firm's access to credit from 
formal financial intermediaries, most notably banks.   9
There are some notable differences between ownership types with regard to 
formal finance, trade credit extended, and profitability (Table 3). On average, state-
owned firms enjoy substantially more access to formal finance: the ratio of interest 
payments to sales is 6.2% for SOEs. In contrast, this ratio is 3.2% for legal person-owned 
firms, 2.9% for collective firms, 2.2% for domestic private firms, and 1.9% for foreign 
firms.  The low access to formal finance for foreign firms could be because the demand 
for external finance is lower for those firms due to better access to internal finance (i.e., 
greater profitability). The amount of trade credit extended ranges from 18% of total sales 
for the average domestic private firm to 36.5% for the typical SOE.  In general, trade 
credit extension is positively related to state ownership as well as to firm size. 
We use return on sales (ROS) calculated as profit over sales to measure 
profitability.
 7  Disparities in average ROS are also wide, ranging from -0.5% for SOEs to 
13.5% for domestic private firms.  SOEs are therefore the ownership category that suffers 
the most financial stress.  The less formal sector, including collective and domestic 
private firms, is the most profitable.  Sandwiched in between are legal person-owned and 
foreign firms. On average, an SOE in our sample employs about three times as many 
workers as a private domestic firm or collective, and about twice as many workers as a 
legal person-owned or foreign-owned firm.  Despite employing more workers, SOEs 
generate lower average sales than foreign firms (86 versus 105 million Yuan per year). 
The typical SOE is 26 years old, substantially older than the typical collective (15 years), 
legal person-owned firms (12), private domestic firm (11), or foreign firm (7). Thus, the 
basic picture that emerges from our summary statistics is that SOEs are older, larger, less 
profitable and have better access to loans than other types of firms. Legal person- and 
collectively-owned firms, which are likely to have some relationship with the 
government, also tend to be older and receive more credit than private and foreign firms. 
Table 4 displays the time paths of our key variables.  ROS trends upward, from 
6% in 1998 to 11% in 2003.  The ratio of interest payments to sales declines steadily over 
the sample period. This is consistent with the lowering of interest rates that occurred 
during the period and hence does not necessarily imply the tightening of credit supply. 
                                                 
7 We compute return on sales from items found in the system of national accounts as: ROS= (Gross value 
of output – Cost of intermediate inputs – Finance charges – Wages – Current period depreciation) / Total 
Sales.  Another alternative would have been to use firms’ reports of their gross profits. However, Cai, Liu, 
and Xiao (2005) point out and provide evidence that firm owners and managers often hide profits in the 
self-reported figures.    10
The ratio of trade credit to sales trends downward, suggesting that the use of trade credit 
became less important over time.   
Table 5 shows the correlation between formal credit and trade credit (as a share of 
total sales).  Firms of all ownership types show a positive correlation, which may imply 
some redistribution from bank credit to trade credit. SOEs and legal person-owned firms 
exhibit the highest correlation coefficients (0.31 and 0.34, respectively), followed by 
collective and private firms (0.28), and foreign firms at 0.18.  The relatively weak link for 
foreign firms might not be surprising: trade credit relationships need time to foster, and 
foreign firms tend to be much younger than other ownership types (Table 3).  
 
3.  Empirics  
Our primary goal is to examine which types of firms are more likely to extend 
trade credit, which we do via the following regression:   
TRADE CREDITit = αi + β1 OWNERSHIPit + β2 PROFITABILITYit-1 + 
            β3 OWNERSHIPit × BANK it-1 +             (1) 
            β4OWNERSHIPit × PROFITABILITYit-1 × BANKit-1+ 
           β5 Xit + εit   
 
TRADE CREDIT is the amount of accounts receivable relative to total sales for 
firm i in year t. α is a firm-specific intercept. OWNERSHIP represents a vector of dummy 
variables for the ownership types described above. In the results that follow, state 
ownership is the omitted category. We also control for PROFITABILITY  (ROS), 
calculated as described above. We lag profitability one year to help address simultaneity 
problems. The crux of our analysis is the relation between trade credit and formal credit. 
The redistribution view of trade credit holds that firms with better access to credit 
redistribute some of the credit to less advantaged (but creditworthy) firms in the form of 
trade credit (Coricelli, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende, 
2006). The extent of redistribution from formal credit to trade credit could depend on the 
type of ownership. For example, SOEs that have privileged access to formal credit but 
few growth or investment opportunities may be more able and willing to engage in on-
lending to their customers. In contrast, private firms may be credit constrained relative to 
their growth opportunities, and thus less willing or able to redistribute what little credit   11
they have to their customers. In the regression, therefore, we interact the ownership 
variables with our proxy for formal finance, BANK, defined as interest payments divided 
by total sales. Again, to avoid simultaneity problem, we lag BANK one year. 
In some specifications, we interact the ownership dummy variables with lagged 
profitability and formal finance. We include this triple interaction term to test whether the 
redistribution effect depends on profitability (Biais and Gollier, 1997). For the reasons 
discussed earlier, we expect that unprofitable SOEs might redistribute the most credit 
because of privileged access to loans and relatively few productive investment 
opportunities. Below, we also explore the possibility that some of the trade credit 
extended by unprofitable SOEs is involuntary. For private firms, trade credit represents 
an alternative informal delivery channel for their customers that are creditworthy but shut 
off from formal sources of finance. We expect that profitable private firms would be best 
positioned to assist their customers in this way, in part because their profits provide a 
source of investable resources in addition to the loans that they receive. 
Finally, X represents additional control variables that might affect the amount of 
trade credit that a firm extends. The first is firm age, which we expect to be positively 
related to extension of trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). In their examination of 
relational contracting in Vietnam, McMillan and Woodruff (1999) find that longer 
duration in a trading relationship is associated with larger amounts of trade credit. 
Presumably, older firms are more likely to have established trust with their customers. 
We also include firm size measured as once-lagged total sales because larger firms tend 
to produce intermediate goods, whose clients tend to be small private firms facing credit 
constraints. Moreover, firm size may directly improve the ability to offer trade credit. 
Finally, we include the Herfindahl index for each firm’s industry because Fisman and 
Raturi (2004) find that monopoly power is negatively correlated with the provision of 
trade credit. They hypothesize that firms with market power present holdup problems ex 
post that deter borrowers from investing in establishing the creditworthiness necessary to 
sustain these trading relationships.  The Herfindahl index is measured at the four-digit 
industry-year level. 
Note that we have controlled for the firm fixed effects, which allows us to control 
for unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity. One important element of firm 
heterogeneity is the price of trade credit.  Trade credit usually is associated with an   12
implicit interest rate for delayed payment. Such interest rates tend to be firm-specific and 
time-invariant (or driven by underlying macroeconomic trends).  Controlling for firm 
fixed effects and year effects should thus allow us to hold constant the implicit price of 
trade credit. 
To get a more complete picture of the efficiency of formal and informal finance, it 
is also necessary to understand how the determinants of access to loans vary across types 
of firms. In so doing, we also hope to shed light on which types of firms are in a better 
position to extend trade credit. Previous studies of China have found that loss-making 
SOEs receive a disproportionate share of bank finance (Cull and Xu, 2003). We test 
whether that same relationship holds for our dataset, which covers a slightly later period 
than that used in other studies and includes many more firms. We therefore run the 
following regression to describe access to formal finance: 
 
 BANKit =  i α + β1OWNERSHIPit + β2 PROFITABILITYit-1 + 
            β3OWNERSHIP it  × PROFITABILITYit-1 + β4 Xit + εit           (2) 
To mitigate problems stemming from reverse causality (i.e., from bank finance to 
profitability), profitability is once-lagged.  Because we also control for firm fixed effects, 
we are using within-firm variation to investigate the relationship between changes in firm 
performance and changes in the firm’s access to formal finance. 
 
4.  Results 
a.  Access to Formal Finance 
We discuss our regressions in reverse order, starting with equation 2. The 
negative, significant coefficient for lagged ROS in Table 6, column 1, confirms previous 
findings that less profitable firms tend to receive more loans than others. In that sense, the 
allocation of credit appears to be inefficient. Controlling for profitability, SOEs receive 
the most formal credit, followed by collective and legal-person firms, and then by 
domestic private and foreign firms. Thus the formal state-owned financial system in 
China shows an institutional bias in favor of SOEs and against private enterprises. 
To test whether the negative relationship between profitability and formal finance 
is driven by state banks lending more, voluntarily or otherwise, to underperforming firms, 
in column 2 we re-run the specification for the sub-sample of more profitable firms, that   13
is, for firm-years with profitability above the median level (0.104).  We find that the 
negative relationship is no longer statistically significant at the 5 percent level.   
Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient for lagged ROS is much reduced, from -0.008 
to -0.001. Relatively inefficient firms therefore receive more formal credit when they 
make less profit (or make greater losses); relatively efficient firms do not however 
receive more formal credit as their profits increase.
8 In that sense, the financial system 
provides soft budget constraints for inefficient firms. 
We suspect that the above relationships between profitability and formal credit 
vary across ownership types. In column 3, we interact ownership types with profitability. 
Except for domestic private firms, the interaction with lagged ROS is negative and 
significant at the one-percent level.  Moreover, the negative coefficient for SOEs is at 
least twice as large (in absolute value) as those for other ownership types.  For domestic 
private firms, the correlation is positive though insignificant, with a t-value of 1.61.   In 
column (4), we again use the more profitable sub-sample, and find that the negative 
relationships between profitability and formal credit access for ownership types other 
than domestic private firms are driven by the less profitable firms. That is, the interaction 
with profitability is not significant for any ownership type. The results from columns (3) 
and (4) together suggest that China’s banking system allocates more credit to 
underperforming SOEs than they deserve.  These results are similar to findings from 
another transition economy, Poland, by Coricelli (1996). 
To test whether there were changes in the way formal finance was allocated as 
China’s transition progressed, in columns (5) and (6) we allow the ownership-specific 
link between lagged profitability and bank finance to change for the second half of our 
six year sample period, i.e., the post-2000 period. Table 6 suggests that the allocation of 
formal credit became less biased, as shown by the positive significant coefficients for the 
post-2000 interactions across ownership types.  For the pre-2001 period, firms of all 
ownership types have a negative correlation between lagged ROS and formal finance, 
with domestic private firms having the weakest link among all.  Interestingly, foreign 
firms with lower ROS also obtained more formal finance in this period.  Thus there is 
some evidence that foreign firms also enjoyed subsidies from the banking system in the 
earlier period. This is consistent with Huang (2003), which presents evidence that local 
                                                 
8 Of course, more profitable firms might have sufficient internal resources that they do not need or want to 
borrow from banks.   14
governments offered preferential treatment to foreign investors to compete for foreign 
direct investment. Again, however, the summary statistics indicate that foreign firms 
borrowed substantially less than other firm types.   
 After 2000, only SOEs still have a negative correlation between profitability and 
loans, but with a much lower magnitude. (The sum of the coefficients of ROS*State and 
ROS*State*post-2000 is -0.009.)  For collective and foreign firms, the link disappears 
completely. For legal-person-owned firms, the link becomes positive but small (0.001, 
which is the sum of two coefficients -0.011 and 0.012).  However, for domestic private 
firms, the link is now positive and significant.  This pattern implies that budget 
constraints were hardened and the allocation of formal credit became more efficient in 
the second half of the sample period. 
  The main conclusion from the formal finance regressions is that relatively 
unprofitable SOEs received disproportionately more credit than other firms throughout 
the period, in line with our expectation that SOEs faced soft budget constraints. The 
relationship between lagged profitability and formal credit was also negative and 
significant for all other firm types prior to 2001, though smaller in magnitude than that 
for SOEs. From 2001 onward there is evidence of a more rational allocation of formal 
credit, as indicated by the stronger positive relationship between formal finance and ROS 
for all types of firms, including a significant positive correlation for domestic private 
firms. 
 
b.  Extension of Trade Credit  
We now explore how the extension of trade credit depends on firm characteristics 
and access to formal finance. The regression results are reported in Table 7. As expected, 
in all regressions SOEs and older firms extend more trade credit relative to their sales 
than other firms. In contrast to other studies (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997), smaller 
firms extend more trade credit as a share of sales. This could be because the customers of 
small firms may be even smaller and need trade finance, or because smaller firms tend to 
know more about their customers and have more ability and incentive to collect 
receivables, and hence are more willing to extend trade credit.  
In column 1, we control for lagged profitability and interact the ownership type 
dummies with the lagged formal finance variable. We thus allow the redistribution from   15
formal credit to trade credit to differ by ownership type. The coefficients for formal 
finance received by SOEs, collectives, and legal person-owned firms are positive and 
significant. By contrast, the coefficients for foreign and domestic private firms are not 
statistically significant and negative for domestic private firms. Consistent with our 
model, these results suggest that enterprises with relatively better access to formal 
sources of credit offer more trade credit to their customers per unit of bank credit.  
The negative relationship between lagged profitability and trade credit in Table 7 
is somewhat puzzling. Petersen and Rajan (1997) also find in their sample of small U.S. 
firms that, conditioning on other variables, more profitable firms offer less trade credit. 
But presumably, if trade credit is an efficiency enhancing informal financing mechanism, 
we would expect that more profitable firms extend more trade credit. Petersen and Rajan 
(1997) suggest that firms in trouble may use the extension of trade credit to try to 
maintain their sales, and that some of the trade credit extended by financially distressed 
firms may be involuntary. In our case, the negative relationship may also be driven by the 
fact that less profitable firms, particularly SOEs, have relatively more formal credit and 
can afford to extend more trade credit. A third possibility is that more profitable firms 
have more growth opportunities, but because they do not get proportionately more formal 
finance (Table 6) they may be credit constrained relative to their growth potential, and 
hence offering trade credit is more costly to them.  
To test these possibilities, in column 2 we use the sub-sample of more profitable 
firms (ROS above median) and re-run the regression. The negative relationship between 
ROS and trade credit extension remains for the more profitable firms, which indicates 
that the result for the full sample was not mainly due to involuntary trade credit or easier 
access to bank credit for unprofitable SOEs. We therefore prefer the third interpretation 
above, that more profitable Chinese firms face more binding credit constraints relative to 
their investment opportunities and hence extend less trade credit.  Another possibility is 
that the customers of the most profitable firms have less need of trade finance, either 
because they themselves are also profitable or because they have access to formal sources 
of finance.  
For the relatively profitable sub-sample, the tendency for some ownership types to 
redistribute loans via trade credit is much different than it was for the full sample. The 
positive redistribution effect for SOEs (as well as legal person-owned firms) becomes   16
insignificant, whereas domestic private firms now exhibit a strong positive effect. In 
other words, the positive redistribution effect for SOEs is driven by less profitable SOEs. 
By contrast, column 2 indicates that it is the relatively profitable firms that drive the 
positive association between formal credit and extension of trade credit among the private 
domestic owners. 
A more direct test of whether private domestic firms are more likely to extend 
trade credit at higher profitability levels comes from adding a triple interaction term that 
multiplies the ownership dummy variables by profitability and formal finance (columns 3 
and 4). The triple interaction term is large, positive, and highly significant for private 
domestic firms, insignificant for all other ownership types. When we restrict ourselves to 
the sub-sample of relatively profitable firms in column 4, the triple interaction for private 
domestic firms is no longer significant, but the simple interaction between private 
domestic ownership and formal credit is positive and highly significant. Therefore, 
private domestic firms in the relatively profitable sub-sample all tend to redistribute a 
high share of their loans as trade credit, an effect that does not change as profitability 
improves.
9 Taken together, regressions 3 and 4 indicate that extension of trade credit is 
more prevalent among private domestic firms with above-average profitability, as we 
hypothesized. Because credit constraints are more binding for private firms, their total 
level of investable resources is low when their profit is low; at higher profitability levels, 
our results suggest they are willing and able to redistribute some of their credit to their 
customers.  
By contrast, our evidence indicates that SOEs are less credit constrained than 
private firms, and in fact face soft budget constraints. In Section 2, we speculated that 
less profitable SOEs receive more formal credit than their growth opportunities warrant, 
and hence could afford to extend more trade credit per unit of formal credit than more 
profitable SOEs that have more growth opportunities. The regressions in this section are 
consistent with that conjecture. Moreover, Ge and Qiu (2005) find that non-state-owned 
firms receive more trade credit than state-owned firms, and are more likely to use that 
                                                 
9 The lagged ROS variable is, however, negative and significant in column 4. This again points to the 
possibility that among the most profitable firms, higher ROS may be associated with more opportunities for 
growth. Being more financially constrained relative to their financing needs than other firms, the most 
profitable might find credit redistribution less appealing than firms at lower profitability levels. 
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funding for investment purposes. It is therefore conceivable that the trade credit extended 
by relatively unprofitable SOEs could result in an improved allocation of loanable funds. 
We are, however, reluctant to draw that conclusion. If the accounts receivable of a 
less profitable SOE are not new credits voluntarily extended but rather reflect delinquent 
payments by its customers, then that SOE may seek to borrow more money from banks to 
cover the shortfall. In that case, we would also expect a positive correlation between 
formal credit and trade credit. Although in the trade credit extension regressions we have 
allowed for firm fixed effects and also regressed contemporaneous trade credit on lagged 
bank credit, there is still a possibility that the relationship between trade credit and bank 
credit runs from the former to the latter or for them to be simultaneously determined.  For 
instance, an SOE may have a large stock of accumulated arrears that require fresh 
infusions of bank loans over multiple years. 
Chinese SOEs may be especially vulnerable to the default risk associated with 
trade credit for two reasons. First, SOEs do not have good incentives to screen trade 
credit recipients, and second, SOEs do not go after accounts receivable as doggedly as 
other firms. Corruption by SOE managers or their sales people exacerbates these two 
problems. Furthermore, when an SOE faces financial trouble due to financial arrears, 
they are more likely to be saved by the state banks than other firm types. For all these 
reasons, the reverse causal relation from trade credit to formal credit would be most 
likely for SOEs. 
To check the possibility of reverse causality, we re-run the credit access 
regression as follows: 
 
BANKit =  i α + β1OWNERSHIPit + β2 PROFITABILITYit-1 + 
            β3OWNERSHIP it  × TRADE CREDITit-1 + β4 Xit + εit           (3) 
Again, since soft budget constraints are more likely to be faced by relatively unprofitable 
firms, we also re-run equation (3) on the profitable sub-sample. In Table 8, column 1, 
lagged trade credit is positively associated with formal credit, consistent with the 
conjecture that firms that extend more trade credit—some of which is likely to reflect 
financial arrears—seek more loans to keep themselves afloat.  In column 2, that link is a 
bit weaker for the profitable sub-sample. When we interact trade credit with the 
ownership dummies in column 3, we find no significant link for private firms, suggesting   18
that state banks or other financial intermediaries do not subsidize them in cases of trade 
credit default. By contrast, SOEs tend to receive significantly more formal credit when 
they have extended more trade credit. When we restrict ourselves to the profitable sub-
sample in column 4, however, the reverse link between trade credit and formal credit is 
no longer significant at the five percent level for either SOEs or private firms, and the 
differences across most firm ownership types are no longer significant.  
Returning to the trade credit extension regressions in Table 7 for a moment, our 
preferred interpretation is that the positive redistribution from formal credit to trade credit 
for less profitable SOEs arises because much of the trade credit that they extend is 
involuntary, which results in more bank loans to these firms. State banks are apparently 
less likely to subsidize profitable SOEs or other types of firms in this way.  
In Table 9, we allow the relationship between formal credit and trade credit to 
differ across two periods.  For 1998-2000, we find positive redistribution effects from 
loans received to trade credit extended for firms of all ownership types. The effect for the 
post-2000 period is not much different for state, collective and legal person-owned firms, 
but it goes down sharply for private and foreign firms. In fact, these firms actually extend 
less trade credit when they have more formal credit, though the net effect of the pre- and 
post-2000 coefficients is close to zero.  
In the 1998-2000 period, the redistribution effect for collective, domestic private 
and foreign firms increases with profitability, suggesting that when these firms had more 
money, they were willing to redistribute more credit. For the post-2000 period, we still 
observe more loan redistribution via trade credit for private firms that have higher 
profitability. That is, the coefficient on the Bank*ROS*post-2000 dummy is not 
significant, and thus not significantly different from that for the 1998-2000 period. For 
collective firms, the post-2000 profitability interaction is negative and significant, 
negating the positive profitability interaction for the early period. Foreign firms evince a 
similar pattern, except that the post-2000 profitability interaction is not significant. The 
net effect of the two profitability interactions (pre and post-2000) for foreign firms is, 
however, close to zero. Thus, the tendency for profitable collective and foreign firms to 
redistribute loans via trade credit was less pronounced later in the period.  
When we restrict ourselves to the more profitable sub-sample in column 2, we see 
that the redistribution effect again only holds for domestic private firms, and this effect is   19
much higher in the early half of the sample period than in the post-2000 period. This 
seems to suggest that the demand for trade credit was lower in the latter sample period, 
consistent with the earlier findings that the allocation of formal credit became more 
efficient in the latter period in Table 6.
10  
Because the multiple interaction terms in column 1 (of Table 9) make it difficult 
to assess the magnitude of the total effects of profitability and access to loans on the 
extension of trade credit for each ownership type, we compute 
credit   formal   credit    trade ∂ ∂  using the coefficients from the model. For each ownership 
type, we compute the redistribution effect for different levels of profitability (Table 10). 
The effect for SOEs is positive and significant for the pooled sample.  It is slightly more 
than 10% larger for the 10
th percentile (in ROS) SOEs than for those in the 90
th percentile, 
which is consistent with the result that less efficient SOEs extend more trade credit per 
unit of formal credit. The difference, however, is not big for the pooled sample.  
The disparity becomes wider for the latter period (compare columns 2 and 3). 
After 2000,  credit   formal   credit    trade ∂ ∂  is 0.18 for SOEs that rank at the 10
th percentile 
in ROS compared to only 0.13 for SOEs at the 90
th percentile. The significance of that 
derivative is also lower for SOEs at higher profitability levels in the latter period. In short, 
the sample split reveals that the tendency for relatively unprofitable SOEs to extend more 
trade credit than others has only grown stronger over time. The pattern is somewhat 
similar for collectives and legal-person owned firms: their redistribution effects were 
significant for firms at all profitability levels in the early period; in the latter one, the 
effect is significant only for the relatively unprofitable, and then only at the five percent 
level. 
Private and foreign firms display somewhat different patterns than other 
ownership types. For the pooled sample, only highly profitable domestic private firms 
redistribute formal credit.  From 1998 to 2000, the models imply positive credit 
redistribution for both types of firms, but unlike SOEs, this effect increases with 
profitability. For domestic private firms, the redistribution effect for the firm at the 90
th 
percentile (in ROS) is 75% higher than that for the firm at the 10
th percentile; for foreign 
firms, the corresponding figure is around 50%.  For the post-2000 period, both types of 
                                                 
10 For collective firms, the redistribution effect in the post-2000 period is negative and decreases with 
profitability for both models in Table 9. This suggests that the most profitable collectives were less likely to 
extend trade credit than others.   20
firms provide less trade credit when they have more formal credit, though the effect is not 
significant at any profitability level for either ownership type. This could indicate that as 
time wore on these firms faced binding credit constraints relative to their tremendous 
growth opportunities, and thus were less apt to extend trade credit.  
It is also possible that their customers were no longer shut out of formal credit 
markets and thus did not need to rely on them for finance. This is also consistent with the 
evidence in Table 6 that the allocation of formal credit grew more rational over time. The 
overall pattern is consistent with the idea that trade credit, an informal financing 
mechanism, was gradually giving way to more formal ones.  This corresponds well with 
the conjecture about the development of transition economies from McMillan and 
Woodruff (2002) that as transition goes along, formal institutions become increasingly 
important, even indispensable in supporting arms-length contracting.  It is also telling that 
the redistribution effects for unprofitable SOEs grew stronger while those for private 
domestic, foreign, and profitable firms of all ownership types disappeared. We view this 
pattern as additional support for the notion that SOE trade credit was associated with 
substantial financial arrears and did not bring about a substantial improvement in credit 
allocation. 
All in all, the redistribution effect from formal credit to trade credit is just slightly 
more than 0.15 for SOEs and is less than 0.28 for all firms in the first half of the sample 
period. Because some, or even much, of the redistribution from SOEs was used to cover 
arrears, the 0.15 coefficient represents an upper bound on the positive effect that 
redistribution might have had on credit allocation. Assuming a redistribution effect of 
0.2, a 100% increase in formal credit from its mean in 1999 (0.044 from Table 4) would 
lead to an increase in trade credit relative to sales of 0.0088, a 3% increase relative to the 
mean for trade credit in the same year. Magnitudes using other years are similar. These 
are therefore economically small effects. It seems unlikely that the redistribution of 
formal credit to trade credit was capable of sustaining the lion’s share of the economic 
growth in China during this period.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
Using an unusually broad sample of Chinese firms and enterprises, we find that 
formal credit allocation in China was biased towards relatively unprofitable SOEs and   21
thus inefficient; there is evidence, however, that the allocation of formal credit improved 
over time. A biased and inefficient banking system may in principle give rise to the 
substitution of trade credit for formal credit. However, we do not find strong evidence 
that trade credit played an economically significant role in China. SOEs did extend more 
trade credit than other types of firms, though this is almost certainly due to involuntary 
lending by less profitable SOEs to cover financial arrears, a situation stemming in part 
from their low incentives to collect receivables. Profitable private firms also on-lent part 
of their formal credit via trade credit to support their trading partners, and the on-lending 
declined when the allocation of formal credit became more efficient. Trade credit might 
therefore have provided a substitute for loans for private firms’ trading partners that were 
shut out of formal credit markets.  
Overall, the magnitude of the on-lending was small relative to the size of the 
formal financial sector. In fact, the accounts receivable to sales ratio for the firms and 
enterprises in our sample ranges from 18% for private domestic firms to 36.5% for SOEs. 
It is higher than, but still comparable to, 18.5% for the U.S. Compustat firms (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1997, p.669), which also casts doubt on whether trade credit can account for 
more than a fraction of China’s explosive growth.  It seems likely that trade credit was 
but one of a vast portfolio of formal and informal arrangements that sustained Chinese 
growth during this period.     22
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                                           Table 1. Sample Characteristics 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Firms in sample 48,013 101,471 107,688 100,265 116,200 102868
GDP of China (Billions Yuan) 7835 8207 8947 9731 10479 11728
% GDP accounted for by sample 11.1 20.3 21.7 20.8 24.6 25.2
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Table 2. Evolution of Ownership over Time:  
Share of firms in Sample, By Ownership type 
 
Year State  Collective
Legal-
person Domestic  private  Foreign 
1998 0.329  0.285  0.132  0.131  0.124 
1999 0.303  0.268  0.149  0.151  0.128 
2000 0.256  0.236  0.172  0.202  0.133 
2001 0.203  0.192  0.187  0.274  0.144 
2002 0.185  0.168  0.191  0.306  0.150 
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                      Table 3. Sample Characteristics, By Type of Owner 
 
 State-Owned  Collective  Legal-Person  Domestic  Private  Foreign 
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Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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                      Table 4.  Variation in Key Variables over Time 
 
  ROS  Access to formal credit  Trade credit 
year  Mean Std. Mean  Std.  Mean Std. 
1998  0.064 0.322 0.053  0.078  0.258 0.348 
1999  0.076 0.313 0.044  0.072  0.272 0.373 
2000  0.088 0.293 0.035  0.061  0.260 0.370 
2001  0.100 0.275 0.029  0.054  0.236 0.345 
2002  0.107 0.269 0.026  0.050  0.230 0.332 
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Table 5.  Correlation of Between Formal Finance Received and Trade Credit 
Extended: By Ownership Type 
 











                            Note.  In parentheses are p-values.  31
                         Table 6.  Determinants of Access to Formal Finance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 full  sample 
profitable 
sample full  sample 
profitable 
sample full  sample 
profitable 
sample 
Collective  -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 
  (10.77)**  (4.12)** (10.85)**  (3.17)** (10.65)**  (3.10)** 
Legal-Person -0.006  -0.003  -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 
  (11.24)**  (4.80)** (11.53)**  (3.59)** (11.22)**  (3.79)** 
Domestic Private  -0.007  -0.003 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 -0.003 
  (13.37)**  (5.34)** (14.94)**  (3.59)** (14.39)**  (3.83)** 
Foreign  -0.007 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 
  (10.61)**  (5.56)** (10.45)**  (4.46)** (10.47)**  (4.74)** 
ln(Sales 1 − t )  -0.000  0.000 -0.000  0.000 -0.001  -0.000 
  (1.58) (0.16) (1.20) (0.17) (2.33)*  (0.05) 
ln(firm  age)  0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
  (9.53)** (4.82)** (9.46)** (4.81)** (9.08)** (4.53)** 
Herfindahl 0.004  0.000  0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 
  (0.74) (0.10) (0.69) (0.10) (0.69) (0.12) 
1 − t ROS   -0.008 -0.001        
  (14.10)**  (1.86)      
1 − t ROS  * State    -0.016  -0.001  -0.022  0.002 
    (13.69)**  (0.70)  (15.60)**  (1.07) 
1 − t ROS  * Collective    -0.005  -0.001  -0.010  0.001 
    (4.58)**  (0.65)  (8.07)**  (0.93) 
1 − t ROS  * Legal-person    -0.004  -0.001  -0.011  0.001 
    (2.88)**  (0.74)  (6.57)**  (0.54) 
1 − t ROS  * Domestic private    0.002  -0.003  -0.005  0.002 
    (1.61)  (1.90)  (3.74)**  (1.12) 
1 − t ROS  * Foreign    -0.007  -0.001  -0.017  -0.001 
    (5.32)**  (0.75)  (9.72)**  (0.44) 
1 − t ROS  * State * post-2000      0.013  -0.007 
      (7.73)**  (3.63)** 
1 − t ROS  * Collective* post-2000      0.010  -0.005 
      (7.32)**  (2.97)** 
1 − t ROS  * Legal-person* post-2000      0.012  -0.003 
      (6.38)**  (1.81) 
1 − t ROS  *Domestic private*post-2000      0.010  -0.007 
      (6.77)**  (3.90)** 
1 − t ROS  * Foreign* post-2000      0.017  -0.001 
      (8.52)**  (0.34) 
Observations  477702 236747 477702 236747 477702 236747 
R-squared 0.76  0.78  0.77 0.78 0.77 0.78 
The dependent variable is interest payments over sales. 
All models include firm fixed effects. 
Profitable sub-sample refers to those firm-years in which  1 − t ROS  >median ROS (10.1%). 
* and ** represent statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels. 
Standard errors are White-corrected. 
Year dummies are also controlled for, and their coefficients are not reported. 
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 Table 7.  Trade Credit, Profitability and Formal Finance 
 (1)  (2)    (3) (4)   








Collective  -0.022 -0.019   -0.024 -0.019   
  (6.40)** (3.42)**   (6.79)** (3.44)**   
Legal-Person  -0.029 -0.024   -0.031 -0.023   
  (8.90)** (4.20)**   (9.08)** (4.17)**   
Domestic Private  -0.033 -0.031   -0.037 -0.031   
  (9.75)** (5.39)**   (10.72)** (5.45)**   
Foreign  -0.020 -0.013   -0.022 -0.012   
  (4.58)** (1.94)    (5.04)** (1.78)  




  (6.85)** (2.16)*    (6.63)** (2.17)*   
ln(firm age)  0.018 0.014   0.018 0.014   
  (15.33)** (8.08)**    (15.24)** (8.08)**   
Herfindahl  0.017 -0.003    0.017 -0.003   
  (0.55) (0.05)   (0.53) (0.05)   




 (6.95)**  (4.56)**    (7.42)** (3.35)**   




 (6.22)**  (1.13)    (4.53)** (1.27)  




 (3.30)**  (2.53)*    (3.86)** (2.78)**   




 (3.37)**  (0.99)    (3.51)** (0.99)  




      (1.33)  (2.61)**    (0.71) (2.96)**   




 (1.07)  (0.07)    (1.58) (0.44)   




              (0.84) (0.44)   




             (1.61) (0.87)   




             (0.11) (0.13)   




             (4.74)** (0.70)  




             (1.15) (0.71)   
Observations 476810  235587    476810 235587   
R-squared 0.76  0.80    0.76 0.80   
The dependent variable is accounts receivable over sales. 
All models include firm fixed effects. 
Profitable sub-sample refers to those firm-years in which  1 − t ROS  >median ROS (10.1%). 
* and ** represent statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels. 
Standard errors are White-corrected. 
Year dummies are also controlled for, and their coefficients are not reported.   33
           Table 8. Tests for Reverse Causality 
            Dependent variable = Formal Finance Access 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  full sample  profitable sample  full sample  profitable sample 
Collecitve -0.005  -0.003  -0.004  -0.003 
 (10.57)**  (4.01)**  (6.47)**  (3.78)** 
Legal-person -0.006  -0.003  -0.004  -0.003 
 (11.07)**  (4.67)**  (6.54)**  (3.83)** 
Citizen -0.007  -0.003  -0.004  -0.003 
 (13.13)**  (5.17)**  (7.19)**  (4.40)** 
Foreign -0.007  -0.004  -0.005  -0.005 
 (10.42)**  (5.47)**  (7.76)**  (5.05)** 
ln(Sales 1 − t )  0.000 0.001  0.000  0.001 
  (1.96) (1.95)  (1.75)  (1.95) 
ln(firm age)  0.002 0.001  0.002  0.001 
  (9.32)** (4.72)**  (9.29)**  (4.71)** 
Herfindahl  0.004 0.001  0.004  0.001 
  (0.71) (0.19)  (0.68)  (0.18) 
1 − t ROS   -0.008 -0.002  -0.008  -0.002 
 (13.73)**  (2.18)*  (13.60)**  (2.19)* 
Trade Credit 1 − t   0.005 0.004     
 (6.95)**  (3.53)**     
Trade Credit 1 − t * state     0.008  0.003 
     (6.85)**  (1.51) 
Trade Credit 1 − t * collective     0.003  0.005 
     (2.69)**  (3.16)** 
Trade Credit 1 − t * legal-person     0.003  0.003 
     (2.36)*  (1.78) 
Trade Credit 1 − t * domestic private     -0.001  0.003 
     (1.08)  (1.94) 
Trade Credit 1 − t * foreign     0.005  0.004 
     (3.61)**  (2.23)* 
Observations 475274  235734  475274  235734 
R-squared 0.77  0.78  0.77  0.78 
All models include firm fixed effects. 
Profitable sub-sample refers to those firm-years in which  1 − t ROS  >median ROS (10.1%). 
* and ** represent statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels. 
Standard errors are White-corrected. 
Year dummies are also controlled for, and their coefficients are not reported.   34
Table 9.  Trade Credit, Profitability and Formal Finance: By Periods 
  (1) full sample  (2) profitable sample 
Collective  -0.023 -0.019 
  (6.59)** (3.41)** 
Legal-Person  -0.030 -0.024 
  (8.94)** (4.21)** 
Domestic Private  -0.036 -0.031 
  (10.41)** (5.46)** 
Foreign  -0.020 -0.011 
  (4.60)** (1.61) 
1 − t ROS   -0.025 -0.021 
 (7.31)**  (3.35)** 
1 − t BANK *State  0.156 0.166 
 (4.64)**  (1.30) 
1 − t BANK *State* post-2000  -0.005 -0.076 
      (0.13)  (0.49) 
1 − t BANK *Collective  0.151 0.190 
 (4.01)**  (1.87) 
1 − t BANK *Collective* post-2000  -0.012 0.195 
      (0.24)  (1.36) 
1 − t BANK *Legal-Person  0.171 0.121 
 (3.88)**  (0.88) 
1 − t BANK *Legal * post-2000  -0.065 -0.018 
     (1.24)  (0.10) 
1 − t BANK *Domestic private  0.170 0.548 
      (3.56)**  (3.89)** 
1 − t BANK *Domestic private * post-2000  -0.256 -0.338 
      (4.59)**  (2.02)* 
1 − t BANK *Foreign  0.218 0.052 
 (3.07)**  (0.21) 
1 − t BANK *Foreign* Post-2000  -0.293 -0.363 
     (3.44)**  (1.09) 
1 − t BANK * 1 − t ROS * State  -0.009 -0.035 
        (0.21)  (0.18) 
  1 − t BANK * 1 − t ROS * State * post-2000  -0.055 -0.080 
        (0.95)  (0.26) 
1 − t BANK * 1 − t ROS * Collective  0.221 0.126 
       (3.43)**  (0.68) 
  1 − t BANK * 1 − t ROS * Collective *post-2000  -0.316 -0.741 
       (2.63)**  (2.08)* 
1 − t BANK * 1 − t ROS * Legal-Person  0.025 0.107 
       (0.34)  (0.32) 
1 − t BANK * 1 − t ROS * Legal * post-2000  -0.041 -0.268 
       (0.40)  (0.58) 
1 − t BANK * 1 − t ROS * Domestic private  0.354 -0.340 
       (3.29)**  (1.05) 
1 − t BANK * 1 − t ROS * D. private * post-2000  0.135 0.225 
       (0.89)  (0.50)   35
1 − t BANK * 1 − t ROS * Foreign  0.196 0.350 
       (2.06)*  (0.68) 
1 − t BANK * 1 − t ROS * Foreign * post-2000  -0.226 -0.275 
      (1.37)  (0.36) 
Observations 476810  235587 
R-squared 0.76  0.80 
The dependent variable is accounts receivable over sales. 
All models include firm fixed effects. 
Other controls (unreported) are log firm size, log firm age, the Herfindahl index, and year dummies.  
Their coefficients are not reported. 
Profitable sub-sample refers to those firm-years in which  1 − t ROS  > median ROS (10.1%). 
* and ** represent statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels. 
Standard errors are White-corrected.   36
      Table 10.  The Implied Redistribution Effect from Formal Credit to Trade Credit  
        
 ROS  percentiles 
(from less to 
more profitable) 
1998-2003 1998-2000 post-2000 


















        


















        


















        


















        


















Standard errors in parentheses.  The results are based on regressions in Tables 7 and 9.
 
 